OceanGate, the company responsible for the ill-fated Titan submersible, is facing harsh blowback, and rightfully so. A U.S. Coast Guard investigation found a pattern of egregious safety violations and shocking management behavior. The report sheds light on immense financial pressures that led OceanGate to make this fateful decision. They selected text-based communications to avoid the overwhelming noise associated with the industry standard, voice communication within submersibles. This decision, compounded by a combination of bad design and construction of the Titan’s hull, resulted in a fatal implosion. This accident was part of a 2023 expedition to the Titanic wreck site.
The incident report found that the OceanGate team didn’t conduct an in-depth inspection of the Titan’s exterior before its last voyage. Their no fault found upon review. Yet, this oversight, which remains to be explained further, calls into question the depth of checks that were being made on the submersible. In particular, the report highlights that OceanGate’s management repeatedly chose marketing and the company’s public perception over safety and reliability.
In May 2017 OceanGate started designing and building their own submersibles. Design-wise, this shift resulted in a lot of lost expertise within their engineering team. As shipboard frustrations boiled over during the final 2023 Titanic expedition, crew members grew worried about their lack of experience. In fact, as recently as March, OceanGate asked employees to waive their pay in order to save costs, adding further safety risks.
Stockton Rush, OceanGate’s now-infamous CEO, was an ardent opponent of redundant safety systems. Frequently characterized as an experimental “MacGyver,” he employed dangerous shortcuts that would make most industry professionals gasp in horror. The investigation by the Coast Guard also concluded that Rush had sidelined the company’s board of directors. This enabled him to move forward without appropriate oversight and accountability.
“Overall, the MBI believes Mr. Rush deliberately sidelined OceanGate’s Board and did not solicit its collective expertise so he could proceed unchecked with his vision to conduct TITANIC expeditions, regardless of any mounting safety concerns.” – US Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation
Rush’s incendiary opinions on safety went beyond the unacceptable to the absurd, with declarations that downplayed the dangers of diving in unproven conditions.
“At some point, safety just is pure waste.” – Stockton Rush
Furthermore, he ignored warnings from trained experts. An engineering director told advancing the cause of safety that Rush bullied him into making hard calls on his safety protocols.
“According to him, the message was clear: Either he or I had to go. Then he looked at me and said, ‘It’s not going to be me.’” – Engineering Director
What the investigation revealed is a very alarming reality. OceanGate improperly presented the “mission specialists” as trained professionals when, in fact, they were nothing more than paying passengers. This false representation played a role in creating a workforce culture where safety was discouraged.
OceanGate paid lip service to safety at best. This toxic workplace culture set the stage for what many consider a preventable tragedy. An engineering director previously opposed diving with a hull containing significant cracks, stating:
“I was strongly opposed to diving in a hull with a significant crack, even at the dock.” – Engineering Director
OceanGate faced backlash over leaving the Titan submersible and its equipment under the open sky in Canada. This left the equipment vulnerable to any environmental harm. One of its past directors raised some alarms about the integrity of the initial hull based on what had already been damaged.
“I’m not impressed with the seamanship and deck work standards of OceanGate — while they are engineers, the effort feels amateurish.” – Mission Specialist
The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation found that failure to analyze post-surfacing data constituted a serious deviation for the standard of care.
“The failure to properly analyze post-surfacing data … represents a grave oversight, due to negligence.” – US Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation
The probe reveals the toxic injuries of a culture where safety was actively hushed.
“The cumulative effect was an authoritarian and toxic culture where safety was not only deprioritized but actively suppressed.” – US Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation
