Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, today’s Prime Minister of Iraq, seems to be preparing for a second term. He is fully in campaign mode with parliamentary elections currently scheduled for November 11, 2025. Al-Sudani chairs the Construction and Development Coalition. He hopes to ride on his administration’s accomplishments in delivering quality public services and ensuring balanced relations with all foreign powers. Yet his ambitions are severely complicated by the opposition of a powerful rival coalition in the political arena.
In May of 2025, the Construction and Development Coalition was revealed. It represents seven strong political winds, with strong tribal leaders (sheikhs) and about 53 current Members of Parliament (MPs). The latter group of MPs were primarily elected as independents during the 2021 elections. The rest were splinters from parties associated with the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF).
Coalition Composition and Political Dynamics
This coalition reflects a strategic design by al-Sudani to unite diverse actors to one strong base of support. Leaders of tribal federations have become important players in Iraqi politics. Their power behind the local constituencies is finally beginning to be acknowledged. The coalition with established MPs deepens the chinks in al-Sudani’s armor, giving him the ability to neutralize habitual kingmakers from the SCF.
This coalition isn’t without its contradictions. To these SCF leaders — none more so than Nouri al-Maliki and Qais al-Khazali — al-Sudani’s pursuit of an independent power base would be a mortal danger. This move is a direct challenge to their long-time hegemony in Shia politics. This new tension raises serious questions about the coalition’s durability beyond election day. If they win the most seats, will they be able to keep it together?
Now al-Sudani is doubling down on his promise to improve public services. He’s made this focus a central tenet of his campaign. His administration has completed a difficult diplomatic balancing act, providing some cover by keeping relations between Tehran and Washington evenly marbled. Since October 7, 2023, he’s managed to keep Iraq out of the rising regional conflagration. This accomplishment is boosting his leadership bona fides with voters looking to the surest hand to stability.
Electoral Strategies and Future Alliances
With elections just around the corner, it looks like al-Sudani’s coalition will win enough parliamentary seats to form a government. The prospect for a breakdown hangs heavy in the air after the election results. Observers anticipate al-Sudani to move swiftly to create new coalitions. This strategy is important to him if he wants to defend his seat in the caretaker prime minister’s job.
Al-Sudani’s protection of Tahir al-Fayyad against pressures from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) underscores his efforts to resist factional influences within his party. Al-Sudani’s allies Al-Fayyad takes on the defenders. His strategy is to create the impression of a tough leader of a majority party fighting back against seditious dissent within.
These attempts have not quieted the calls from leaders of competing political factions who continue to make demands on what the prime minister should deliver. Qais al-Khazali stated that al-Sudani’s role should merely be that of a “director-general,” emphasizing an administrative rather than political mandate. He went on to claim that any decision on a political, security or economic issue should fall under the scope of the SCF agreement.
“should not monopolise state decisions … He must return to the Framework for all decisions, whether political, security, or economic” – Qais al-Khazali
Implications for Iraqi Politics
Yet the dynamics that have surrounded al-Sudani’s campaign expose more than just a specific phenomenon of Iraqi politics. The Muhasasa system has historically allowed the Shia parties to dominate the selection of the prime minister. At the same time, the Kurds elect the president, and the Sunnis elect the speaker of parliament. This ideological framework breeds most of the political double-dealing in Iraq. Ultimately, al-Sudani’s efforts to assemble a governing coalition on his own are already severely undercut.
Nouri al-Maliki’s comments further reflect this sentiment: “is not related to the number of seats won.” Even if al-Sudani achieves electoral victories, he will likely find it challenging to push through meaningful policy shifts. Yet the current political landscapes create structural barriers that may block his path toward consolidating power to find success.
Al-Sudani will need to deftly maneuver these contending political and security forces moving forward. His success or failure in doing so will determine his own political future and will help determine the stability of Iraq’s governance for years to come. These elections will be a crucial test for al-Sudani and for the rival camps that have coalesced within Iraqi politics.
